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An Equitable Solution in a Postcrisis World?
Ross Clare
Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 
PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR RETIREMENT IN AUSTRALIA
Australia has a classic three-pillar retirement system:
1) A mandatory contribution, generally to an individual account 
defi ned contribution plan, (made by employers) which is cur-
rently 9 percent of wages, increasing to 9.25 percent from July 
2013 and then currently legislated to gradually increase to 12 
percent by July 2019.
2) Voluntary contributions to pensions, primarily to defi ned contri-
bution plans, many of which attract tax concessions.
3) A government means-tested pension, called the Age Pension, 
commencing at age 65 for males and (currently) 64 for females 
but increasing to age 67 over the next decade. Veterans (pen-
sioners who have been in the armed services) receive identical 
benefi ts but receive them fi ve years earlier than civilians. The 
Age Pension is not earnings related, It is paid at a higher rate to 
low-income persons due to the operation of a means test but is 
received by most retirees.
All elements have been subject to changes for fi scal and other 
reasons.
The voluntary contributions are from a number of sources:
• Employers (usually large companies and governments) that pay 
a higher rate than the law requires for mandatory pensions.
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• Members paying pretax contributions from their salary package. 
The limit of tax-preferenced contributions has fallen signifi -
cantly in recent years.
• Members paying after-tax contributions, which are subject to a 
contribution cap of $A150,000 a year or $A450,000 in a three-
year period. (In early 2013, U.S.$1.00 = A $0.96. Currency con-
version rates vary over time.) 
• The government cocontribution, which matches after-tax contri-
butions up to an amount which is currently A$500.00 a year for 
low-income earners.
The taxation structure for pensions is relatively complicated, but 
in broad terms most members of defi ned contribution funds are taxed 
concessionally (at a reduced and fl at rate) in regard to contributions and 
investment earnings. Benefi ts, both lump sum and in income stream 
form, are tax free when received at age 60 and over. Thus, with T rep-
resenting taxed, t representing concessionally taxed, and E representing 
exempt from tax, this system can be characterized as ttE. By compari-
son, the U.S. tax arrangement for most types of pensions is EET.
Despite the regular changes that governments have made for fi scal 
or equity reasons, the broad structure is robust and is supported by vot-
ers, politicians, and industry. 
A critical element of Australia’s retirement system, including the 
government mandated private pensions, is that members generally carry 
all the investment risks themselves because their pensions generally are 
defi ned contribution plans. While around 10 percent of employees are 
in defi ned benefi t plans, most of these are closed to new members. In 
the long term, almost all members will have defi ned contribution pen-
sions. However, there will be at least some defi ned benefi t pensioners 
in the system for many decades to come.
Also important for the living standards of retirees are
• a high level of home ownership among retirees, and
• government funding on a means-tested basis of residential aged 
care and some other aged care.
The focus of this chapter is on mandatory and voluntary pensions 
and the means-tested Age Pension.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF SUPERANNUATION (PENSIONS) 
IN AUSTRALIA
Occupational superannuation in Australia fi rst emerged in midnine-
teenth century. The term superannuation was in common usage in the 
early nineteenth century to refer to the pension received after retirement 
from the former employer. In most other countries, the term “private 
pensions” tends to be used to describe what is known as superannuation 
in Australia. While it is not entirely clear why the term superannua-
tion is used in Australia, it does provide a clear distinction for private 
arrangements from the government-provided Age Pension. It also is 
more consistent with the availability of lump sum benefi ts from pen-
sions in Australia, which are taken by a substantial number of retirees.
From its earliest days in Australia (with the establishment of a pen-
sion fund for its staff by the Bank of Australasia in October 1842) up to 
the 1940s, pensions were only available to a select, mostly male, group 
of salaried employees in the public sector and some large companies. 
Employer-supported pensions for wage staff tended to be less generous, 
with smaller benefi ts and smaller employer contributions in plans that 
were noncompulsory.
By 1974, 32.2 percent of wage and salary earners were covered 
by pensions, made up of 40.8 percent of male wage and salary earners 
but only 16.5 percent of females. Most pension assets were in defi ned 
benefi t plans. 
In 1983, the newly elected Labor Government expressed support 
for the principles of employee pensions and initiated discussions with 
the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) on the possibility of 
broadening access to pensions as part of the Government’s Prices and 
Incomes Accord with the trade unions. 
The process of making employee pensions a more or less universal 
entitlement began in September 1985 when, with the support of the 
government, the ACTU sought a 3 percent pensions contribution to 
be paid by employers to industry funds specifi ed in relevant industrial 
labor agreements, which set the minimum wages and conditions for 
many but not all employees in Australia. 
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This submission was supported by arguments addressed to
• the implications arising from the trend towards an aging of the 
population including the workforce;
• the effects of the trend for earlier retirement;
• the existing dependency on Age Pensions and the projected sig-
nifi cant increase in the dependency of the aged on the working 
population with an explosion of Age Pension costs; and
• the fact that a large percentage of the workforce was not cov-
ered by existing pension plans and that wide disparities existed 
in coverage according to sex, industry, occupation and income 
levels. In particular, it was submitted that women, manual work-
ers and those in the lower income level were less adequately 
covered than others.
As new labor agreements were progressively negotiated according 
to the guidelines in the national wage case decision, pension coverage 
increased rapidly. In the four years after the introduction of employer 
contributions linked to labor agreements, employee coverage grew 
from around 40 percent to 79 percent. In the private sector, coverage 
grew from 32 percent in 1987 to 68 percent in 1991.
This was a major achievement for collectively bargained pensions, 
but more was needed in terms of coverage and rate of contributions. 
Accordingly, the government at the time announced in the 1991–1992 
budget that it would introduce a mandatory pension system through 
the implementation of the Superannuation Guarantee. The Superannua-
tion Guarantee pension system is based on using the taxation power 
of the Australian government to provide a very powerful incentive for 
employers to make pension contributions of the required amount. The 
guarantee part of the superannuation guarantee is about a requirement 
for contributions being made rather than a guarantee of investment 
earnings or eventual retirement income.
The Superannuation Guarantee system—the mandatory pension 
system—came into effect on July 1, 1992, starting at a minimum con-
tribution level of 3 percent. A schedule of future increases in the rate of 
the Superannuation Guarantee contributions was also set, with a con-
tribution rate for all employees of 9 percent of earnings. Employers 
already making contributions that met the requirements of the Superan-
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nuation Guarantee were not required to make additional contributions. 
Employees now generally are able to choose the fund to which they 
want to contribute, but many employees have contributions made to 
the fund that their employers have selected as the default fund or that is 
specifi ed as a default fund in an industrial award. There are hundreds of 
corporate, retail, industry, and public sector funds and nearly 500,000 
small Self-Managed Superannuation Funds. 
While there has been growth in the number of self-managed super-
annuation funds, the numbers of the other types of funds have decreased 
over time. Self-managed superannuation funds are funds where each 
member is also a trustee of the fund. There is a general prohibition on 
membership of such funds by someone who is an employee of another 
member of the fund. The result is that a small business owner cannot 
include his or her employees in the self-managed superannuation fund 
of which the business owner is a member. They have less than fi ve 
members each, and they differ from the various individually managed 
accounts in other countries in that they are a private trust arrangement 
that does not require a fi nancial institution to be involved as a provider.
The coverage of the system was very broad, using wide defi nitions 
for employer and employee. However, there were some exceptions, 
chiefl y those earning less than A$450 per calendar month, part-time 
employees aged under 18, and those over 65. As well, the Super-
annuation Guarantee does not apply to the self-employed (other than to 
owner-managers who receive wages and technically are employees of a 
company they control). Around 30 percent of the self-employed make 
voluntary contributions, partly driven by the tax concessions avail-
able for this. Some self-employed persons will have a private pension 
because of previous periods when they have been an employee. Some 
contractors who might be regarded as self-employed by other legal pro-
visions are also covered in the compulsory system through an extended 
defi nition of employee.
In May 2010, the Australian Treasurer announced that compulsory 
employer pension contributions were to increase to 12 percent by July 
2019. The increase in mandatory Superannuation Guarantee contribu-
tions is a gradual process, starting with 0.25 percent in the 2013–2014 
fi nancial year, and then a 0.25 percent increase in 2014–2015. For the 
following fi ve years after the 2015 fi nancial year, the Superannuation 
Guarantee rate will increase by 0.5 percent until it reaches 12 percent 
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by July 2019. A new government was elected in September 2013 and as 
part of its election policies indicated an intention to legislate a two year 
pause in the phased increase in the rate of contributions.
THE AGE PENSION NOW AND INTO THE FUTURE
The Age Pension—the means-tested pension—is funded out of 
general tax revenue by the Australian government. It does not require 
either a history of social security contributions by the person or a his-
tory of work; rather, receipt is determined by reaching the eligibility 
age, being a resident in Australia for 20 years, and qualifying under the 
applicable asset and income tests. The maximum benefi t provided by 
the Age Pension as of September 1, 2012, is A$20,142 for a single per-
son and A$30,368 for a couple. The Age Pension is taxable, but due to 
a variety of rebates, those receiving the maximum benefi t generally do 
not pay any income tax. People with higher income and assets in retire-
ment receive a reduced Age Pension. Many people receive a partial Age 
Pension, but persons at the top of the income distribution do not receive 
any benefi t from the Age Pension.
Table 9.1 shows budget standards for a modest and comfortable 
lifestyle as indicated by the Association of Superannuation Funds of 
Australia (ASFA) retirement standard. These budget standards are 
based on a typical retiree at age 65 and are widely used in Australia as 
an indicator of adequacy of retirement income. They are updated regu-
larly on the ASFA Web site (www.superannuation.asn.au). ASFA is a 
private-sector, not-for-profi t organization whose members are pension 
funds and service providers to pension funds.
While these values do not refl ect the situation of every retiree, they 
allow us to gauge the average needs for different lifestyle expectations 
given cost of living in Australia as of December 2012. These are com-
pared with the maximum annual benefi t of the Age Pension as of Sep-
tember 2012.
It is clear that the Age Pension is close to meeting the modest life-
style needs of retirees. As the benefi t is linked to national average wages 
and the modest lifestyle is linked to prices, the Age Pension will gradu-
ally close in on the modest lifestyle for at least a period of some years. 
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The ASFA retirement standard is adjusted for changes in prices every 
quarter, but every four or fi ve years it is adjusted more substantively for 
changes in the pattern of expenditure by retirees and for increases in the 
general living standard of the community. For a comfortable lifestyle, 
retirees need to build their own pension savings, as the Age Pension by 
itself will be inadequate.
THE FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY OF THE AGE PENSION
Australia is unusual in that the future fi nancial impact of programs 
such as the Age Pension is required to be assessed on a regular basis in 
what is known as the Intergenerational Report (IGR) which is prepared 
by the Australian Treasury. The IGR came to life as a key requirement 
of the 1998 Charter of Budget Honesty Act. The charter requires an 
intergenerational report to assess the long-term sustainability of poli-
cies over the 40 years following the release of the report, including the 
impacts of demographic change. The IGR has played a major role in 
raising community awareness of long-term fi scal challenges and, in so 
doing, placed greater focus on government decisions with long-term 
consequences.
For instance, in the fi scal year 2009–2010 budget, the government 
announced increases to Age Pension benefi ts, particularly for single 
persons, following an inquiry process that indicated the desirability 
of increasing such payments. These increases were introduced along 
with a suite of budget-saving measures designed to offset their long-









single couple single couple
Yearly total ($) 22,585 32,555 41,186 56,339
Age Pension ($) 20,142 30,368 20,142 30,368
Difference from 
Age Pension ($)
2,443 2,187 21,044 25,971
NOTE: All values in Australian dollars. 
SOURCE: ASFA (2013).
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term costs. The budget-saving measures included a gradual rise in the 
qualifying age for the Age Pension (to be phased in from 2017 to 2023), 
means testing of the private health insurance rebate, as well as reforms 
to family payments and pensions. The package of changes was pro-
jected to be budget neutral by 2021–2022 and through to 2049–2050 as 
a result of the effect of the expenditure saving measures offsetting the 
increase in the costs of he Age Pension. 
Australia was relatively unusual in the international community in 
that it weathered the global fi nancial crisis without signifi cant impacts 
on economic activity, unemployment, or fi scal outcomes. While the 
current budgetary situation is not without challenges, with the then gov-
ernment recently formally announcing that a target of a budget surplus 
in 2012–2013 would not be met, the budgetary situation has been suf-
fi ciently robust to support both the increase in the Age Pension benefi ts 
and the increased tax expenditures associated with higher compulsory 
contributions to pensions. In regard to the latter, there was an explicit 
linking of the introduction of a new resources rent tax associated with 
certain mining activities with the legislation increasing the Superannua-
tion Guarantee contribution rate. The legislation increasing the Super-
annuation Guarantee contribution reduced income tax receipts due to 
the reduction in net wages, which is only partially offset by the tax 
on contributions, while the resources rent tax provided an offsetting 
increase in taxes. As noted earlier, the government elected in September 
2013 proposes a two-year pause to the increase in the rate of compul-
sory contributions.
However, over a longer time period, aging of the population will 
still contribute to pressure on government spending and fi scal sustain-
ability. The Intergenerational Report (IGR) prepared by the Australian 
Treasury projects total spending to increase to 27.1 percent of GDP in 
2049–2050, around 4.75 percentage points higher than its projected low 
point in 2015–2016. In today’s terms, that is the equivalent of adding 
around $A60 billion a year to government spending.
Around two-thirds of the projected increase in spending over the 
next 40 years is related to health, refl ecting pressures from aging, 
increased community expectations, and the funding of new technolo-
gies. Growth in spending on age-related pensions and aged care is also 
signifi cant, both as a proportion of GDP and in real spending per per-
son. Currently, about a quarter of Australian government spending is 
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on health, age-related pensions, and aged care. The Intergenerational 
Report projects that Australian government spending on these functions 
will increase signifi cantly over the next 40 years, pushing their share of 
spending to almost one-half.
As a proportion of GDP, spending on health is projected to rise from 
4.0 percent to 7.1 percent. Age-related pensions and aged care are pro-
jected to rise from 2.7 percent and 0.8 percent of GDP to 3.9 percent 
and 1.8 percent, respectively, in 2049–2050. Figure 9.1 provides further 
details by each major expenditure category.
Excluding public debt interest, the Intergenerational Report proj-
ects a fi scal gap of 2.75 percent of GDP (or around $A30 billion in 
today’s dollars) by 2049–2050.
Much of the increase in government expenditure on Age Pensions is 
due to population aging. Unlike some countries, such as Japan, the Aus-
tralian population will continue to grow, as annual rates of population 
























SOURCE: Australian Treasury (2010).
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growth are projected to slow gradually, from 2.1 percent in 2008–2009 
to 0.9 percent in 2049–2050. Australia’s population is projected to grow 
from around 22 million people to 35.9 million people in 2050.
As well, average Australian mortality rates have fallen signifi cantly, 
with life expectancies rising for both men and women. These changes 
have added to population growth and the proportion of older people in 
the Australian population. As a result, the number of Australians aged 
65 and over is projected to grow from around 3 million in 2010 to 8.1 
million by 2050, from 2.1 percent of the population to 5.1 percent. As a 
result, the number of people of eligible age for the Age Pension is pro-
jected to increase by around 150 percent by 2049–2050.
There are other factors that affect the projections of age-related pen-
sion spending:
• A decline in the proportion of pensioners receiving a full Age 
Pension, because of the increased value of individuals’ manda-
tory pension and other private assets and income.
• The proportion of people with a partial Age Pension is projected 
to increase signifi cantly while the proportion of the eligible age 
group not receiving any Age Pension is projected to rise slightly.
• As noted earlier, the increase in the level of the Age Pension 
benefi ts has been largely offset by other policy measures, such 
as raising the eligibility age.
When the next Intergenerational Report is prepared in or before 
2015, it can be expected to take into account the phased increase in 
compulsory pension contributions from 9 percent to 12 percent. This 
will further moderate the increase in age-related pension spending, par-
ticularly toward the end of the projection period. 
Of course, there are consequences fl owing from compulsory pen-
sion contributions for the public sector’s contribution to private (and 
therefore national) saving as a result of the compulsory pension system. 
This public sector contribution arises from the tax-preferred status of 
compulsory pension contributions and the assumption by the Austra-
lian Treasury that other expenditures are cut back to allow for this tax 
expenditure. The public sector’s contribution is estimated to be about 
0.4 percent of GDP currently, rising gradually to nearly 0.7 percent of 
GDP by the end of the decade, and then staying around that level to the 
middle of the century.
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The estimated net fi scal cost to the government budget is smaller 
than the public sector’s contribution to private saving, because bud-
get savings arising from the compulsory pension system reduce the 
net fi scal cost of compulsory pensions.  This is because growth in net 
wages is less than it would otherwise be because of the increase in pen-
sion contributions, leading to increases in expenditure on Age Pension 
and other government payments indexed to movements in average net 
wages being less than they would otherwise be.
Equity clearly is a key issue in the debate about pension and retire-
ment income reform. There is strong government and community con-
cern that the assistance provided to retirement income should be spread 
fairly according to need. There also is a strong tradition in Australia of 
support for what we colloquially call a “fair go.” In the context of pen-
sions, this means that no groups should face barriers to participation in 
the retirement income system. 
One statistic that gained some currency in public debate in Aus-
tralia was that 5 percent of individuals account for 37 percent of tax-
preferenced pension contributions. However, that is no longer the case 
and is now something of an urban myth—that fi gure, calculated by the 
Treasury, related to 2005–2006, when pension policy settings were sig-
nifi cantly different than they are now. For instance, in 2005–2006, a 
maximum deductible contribution limit of $A100,587 applied for each 
employee aged 50 and over and for the self-employed aged 50 and over. 
For those aged 35–49 the fi gure was $A40,560 a year.
By fi scal year 2009–2010, a new set of tax-preferenced contri-
bution caps was in force (after a number of variants along the way). 
These caps permitted annual contributions of no more than $A25,000 
a year for those under age 50 and $A50,000 a year for those aged 50 
and over. However, the $A50,000 a year cap was a transitional one and 
expired on June 30, 2012. The government has announced its intention 
to replace these caps with a general cap of $A25,000 a year except for 
those aged 50 and over with less than $A500,000 in pension savings, 
where a $A50,000 a year cap would apply. However, the introduction 
of this higher cap for those aged 50 and over has been delayed due to 
budgetary reasons.
Tax-preferenced contributions include employer contributions 
(including contributions made under a salary sacrifi ce arrangement 
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where wages are traded for extra contributions), and personal contribu-
tions claimed as a tax deduction by a self-employed person. 
Tax Assistance for Pensions after the New Tax-Preferenced 
Contribution Caps
Clear empirical evidence indicates that the contribution caps have 
reduced the tax-preferenced pension contributions made by upper-
income earners. This is refl ected in Table 9.2, which sets out estimates of 
the proportion of tax-preferenced pension contributions made on behalf 
of wage earners in the various marginal income tax bands applying 
in 2009–2010. These estimates are based on data especially extracted 
for ASFA from a large scale survey of Australian households, namely 
the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
Survey.
These estimates of employer contributions are consistent in broad 
terms and produce overall results consistent with aggregate pension 
contributions as reported by the Australian Prudential Regulatory 
Authority (APRA), which is one of the government regulators of the 
fi nancial services industry (including pensions), and Australian Taxa-
tion Offi ce statistical publications.
As is clear from the table, pension contributions are not spread 
entirely evenly across all taxpayers or income ranges. This is because 
one of the basic characteristics of pensions is that contributions are 
linked to employment, particularly full-time employment. Those tax-
payers on very low incomes are not receiving pension contributions 
made by their employers or are receiving the benefi t of only relatively 
small contribution amounts. 
Individuals on a low income in any given year will not necessar-
ily be on a low taxable income for all of their lives. Many individu-
als who have low taxable incomes from employment are undertaking 
part-time employment when they are studying or when they also have 
family responsibilities that prevent them from undertaking full-time 
work. However, over their lifetime they will have many years, usually 
decades, of full-time work. As well, wages often increase in real terms 
over the course of a career. The distribution of taxable incomes and tax 
concessions for pension contributions in any given year is not a good 
indicator of assistance delivered over a lifetime. 
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However, even in regard to a single year, as indicated by Table 9.2, 
around 90 percent of employer contributions relate to individuals on 
less than the top marginal tax rate, with over 50 percent of contributions 
relating to individuals on a marginal income tax rate of 30 percent or 
less. 
The top 5 percent of employees (in terms of income) accounted for 
less than 20 percent of the total pension contributions in 2009–2010.
While upper-income earners typically have more pension contribu-
tions than lower-income earners, the amount related to upper income 
earners is now much lower than it was previously. While a higher fi gure 
may have applied back in 2005–2006, the impact of the contribution 
caps has been considerable. The various changes that have been made 
to the pension tax rules also may have affected confi dence in contribut-
ing to pensions also leading to lower discretionary contributions.
Table 9.3 provides estimates of the amount of tax concession by 
personal income tax rate. It also factors in the receipt of the cocontri-
bution (government matching contribution), which is only available to 
low-income earners making personal contributions.
Table 9.3 indicates that in recent times less than 15 percent of the 
government assistance for pension contributions fl ows to those on the 
top marginal rate. This compares to the around 30 percent of aggregate 
personal income tax collections that is paid by that group of taxpay-
ers. While upper-income earners do receive assistance for their pension 
contributions, the overall personal tax system imposes a substantially 
higher tax burden on upper-income earners compared to those earning 















0–6,000 0 5.4 54 0.1
6,001–37,000 15 31.5 4,255 7.9
37,001–80,000 30 42.7 23,120 43.0
80,001–180,000 38 18.0 20,280 37.7
180,001+ 47 2.4 6,050 11.3
a Based on data extracted for ASFA from Wave 10 of the HILDA survey.
SOURCE: Clare (2012a).
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Value of tax 
concessiona
$A, millions








% of total tax 
concession and 
cocontributionb
0–6,000 0 −8 −0.1 192 1.5
6,001–37,000 15 68 0.6 1,068 8.3
37,001–80,000 30 4,462 39.2 4,662 36.4
80,001–180,000 38 4,968 43.6 4,968 38.8
180,001+ 47 1,906 16.7 1,905 14.9
All employees 11,396 100.0 12,795 100.0
a Takes into account the Medicare levy, the phasing out of the Low Income Tax Offset, and the phasing in of the Medicare liability.
b Column does not sum to 100 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Clare (2012a).
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lower incomes. It could be argued that the general tax and transfer sys-
tem in Australia should and does do most of the “heavy lifting” in terms 
of improving vertical equity.
Table 9.3 also indicates that the bulk of government assistance for 
pensions fl ows to those on either the 30 percent or 38 percent tax rates. 
Such taxpayers make up a very large part of the full-time workforce 
in Australia. Providing the bulk of tax assistance to this group makes 
sense from a public policy point of view. In contrast to very low-income 
earners and those who never have signifi cant wage incomes during their 
lives, they have the potential to fi nance through savings signifi cant 
income in retirement. 
For those on the top marginal tax rate, achievement of signifi cant 
savings in the form of pension savings has the potential to make them 
totally self-funded in retirement, with no reliance on the government-
provided Age Pension. 
The Australian government has also legislated to provide a new 
matching contribution of up to $A500 annually for eligible low-income 
earners from the 2012–2013 income year. The payment will be 15 per-
cent of the eligible tax-preferenced contributions (including employer 
contributions) made by or for individuals with adjusted taxable incomes 
of up to $A37,000. Individuals will also need to meet a test where at 
least 10 percent of their incomes must be from employment or business 
sources and they are a resident of Australia or New Zealand. Individuals 
also can benefi t from the cocontribution in regard to personal contribu-
tions that are not tax-preferenced. 
By its very nature, new matching contributions will only provide 
assistance to low-income earners on either the 0 or 15 percent tax rate. 
However, the government elected in September 2013 has indicated 
its intention to abolish this government contribution for low income 
earners.
As well, the phased increase in the rate of compulsory contributions 
to 12 percent will have its greatest impact on low- and middle-income 
earners, given that those earning higher incomes commonly already 
receive the benefi t of contributions in excess of 9 percent of wages 
and/or will adjust voluntary salary sacrifi ce contributions if there is an 
increase in compulsory contributions.
Table 9.4 compares the distribution of government tax relief and 
contribution assistance for pensions in 2009–2010 for employees on 
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Current value of 
tax concession and 
cocontributiona 
($A, millions)
% of current total 
tax concession and 
cocontributionb
Value of proposed 




% of proposed 
total tax concession 
and government 
contributions
0—6,000 0 192 1.5 210 1.4
6,001–37,000 15 1,068 8.3 1,640 11.0
37,001–80,000 30 4,662 36.4 5,732 38.3
80,001–180,000 38 4,968 38.8 5,465 36.6
180,001+ 47 1,905 14.9 1,905 12.7
All employees 12,795 100.0 14,952 100.0
aTakes into account the Medicare levy, the phasing out of the Low Income Tax Offset, and the phasing in of the Medicare liability. Based 
on 2009–2010 tax rates.
b Column does not sum to 100 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Clare (2012b).
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the basis of current policy settings and what it would have been if a 12 
percent mandatory contribution rate, the low income matching contri-
bution payment and the current rate of cocontribution had all applied in 
that year. While it will be some years before all the measures are fully in 
place this approach illustrates what the eventual impact on the distribu-
tion of government assistance by income level will be.
The combined effect of the government proposed measures would 
have, if they had applied in 2009–2010, increased the total assistance 
for retirement saving for employees earning less than $A80,000 a year 
from $A5,920 million to around $A7,580 million. Expressed as a per-
centage of total government assistance, the share of those earning less 
than $A80,000 a year would have increased from 46.2 percent to 50.2 
percent. Clearly, the measures strongly favor those on lower incomes.
GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE FOR BOTH MANDATORY 
PENSIONS AND THE AGE PENSION
There is also a direct link between the level of retirement savings 
and the subsequent reduction in the government Age Pension. In con-
sidering the equity of government assistance for retirement income, it 
also is necessary to take into account the amount of the Age Pension 
that will eventually be provided on average to persons on various levels 
of earnings and pension contributions during their working life.
This was done in research conducted in 2009 by George Rothman 
of the Australian Treasury Retirement & Intergenerational Modelling 
& Analysis Unit. This research places emphasis on a “whole of life” 
or life cycle perspective where Age Pension benefi ts in the retirement 
phase are included. The cost to government of its retirement income 
policies as a whole is modelled using the Treasury’s comprehensive 
RIMGROUP model.
The base case for this analysis is the retirement income framework 
following the 2009 government budget. Signifi cant changes in that bud-
get included
• a signifi cant increase in Age Pension payments of $A32.49 a 
week for single pensioners and $A10.14 a week combined for 
couple pensioners, together with changes to the income test, 
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whereby the pension taper rate for new pensioners, which re-
duces the Age Pension for persons receiving higher levels of in-
come, is 50 percent rather than 40 percent;
• a gradual increase in the age for eligibility for an Age Pension 
beginning in 2017 so that this age reaches 67 in 2023; and
• a reduction in the annual cap on tax-preferenced pension contri-
butions from $A50,000 to $A25,000 for those younger than 50 
and the transitional cap for those in their 50s from $A100,000 to 
$A50,000. This limit applies to the combined compulsory and 
salary sacrifi ce contributions. Individuals generally will not ex-
ceed this limit as the result of compulsory contributions alone 
given there is a cap on compulsory contributions per job that is 
below the tax-preferenced cap.
The analysis in the Treasury paper indicates that these measures 
have added considerably to the equity of Australia’s retirement income 
system, both by gender and income. The tax-preferenced contribution 
caps budget measure also was found to add even more vertical equity 
to the system with the saving to government revenue impacting mostly 
on the top two deciles of the income distribution for both men and 
women.
Decile NPV1-women NPV1-men NPV1-both
1 1,750 1,600 3,350
2 1,700 1,600 3,350
3 1,650 1,600 3,300
4 1,650 1,600 3,300
5 1,650 1,600 3,200
6 1,650 1,750 3,400
7 1,900 1,800 3,700
8 1,850 1,950 3,800
9 1,850 2,050 3,950
10 1,800 2,450 4,250
All 17,500 18,050 35,550
Table 9.5  Net Present Value of Cost to Government of Retirement 
Income System by Income Level ($A, millions)
NOTE: Columns do not precisely add up to the totals because of rounding.
SOURCE: Clare (2012b).
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The research also indicates that the total amount of government 
support does not vary much across the income deciles or by gender. 
Table 9.5 sets out the Treasury forecasts of government assistance for 
those born in 1960 and retiring in 2027. The proportion of assistance 
provided in the form of tax expenditures on pensions increases with 
higher income with a more or less equivalent decrease in the value of 
Age Pension expenditures. 
Overall government support for the Age Pension was found to 
account for 82 percent of the government assistance to women for their 
retirement and 68 percent of the assistance provided to men.
One group that receives above average assistance is men in the top 
income decile. For the other income deciles, the withdrawal of the Age 
Pension largely matches the assistance given to higher pension contri-
butions. However, this became irrelevant for those who are not entitled 
to even a partial Age Pension. Limiting the tax-preferenced contribu-
tion cap to $A25,000 a year for those aged 50 and over with more than 
$A500,000 in pension is a policy response to this distributional fi nding.
THE REAL EQUITY CHALLENGE
The real issue in regard to equity is that too many Australians have 
too little in retirement savings rather than too much. While much public 
debate has focused on the top 1 percent or 5 percent of income earners, 
there has been little or no debate on how to advance outcomes for the 
other 99 percent or 95 percent. 
If excessive government assistance is a problem, it is restricted to a 
very small number of individuals. This is particularly the case since the 
introduction of progressively tighter caps on both tax-preferenced and 
non-tax-preferenced contributions. When properly measured, the total 
government assistance for retirement income in the form of both the 
Age Pension and tax concessions for pensions is broadly even across 
the entire income distribution. 
After the recent contribution cap and rebate changes to private pen-
sions, 87.3 percent of the tax concessions for pensions will fl ow to indi-
viduals on less than the top marginal tax rate, up from the around 85 
percent, which applied before the changes. The share of total conces-
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sions fl owing to individuals on the top marginal tax rate was around 
50 percent in 2007–2008, with the reduction in the share since then 
due to the introduction of contribution caps and higher rates of tax on 
the contributions of certain upper-income earners, together with the top 
marginal rate applying to a smaller proportion of taxpayers.
ASSISTING THOSE WHO REALLY NEED ASSISTANCE
Evidence from surveys of pension account balances held by indi-
viduals indicates that compulsory pensions have been very effective in 
lifting coverage rates and average pension account balances (Table 9.6). 
The increase in the mandatory Superannuation Guarantee contribu-
tion rate to 12 percent will further improve pension balances at retire-
ment, but it will be 40 or 50 years before the system is fully mature, 
meaning that all workers will be under that regime for their full careers.
However, voluntary contributions have remained fl at in recent years 
in response to both tax changes and investment return developments. In 
particular, contribution caps and other changes to pensions are limit-
ing the amount of voluntary salary sacrifi ce contributions, including by 
individuals seeking to catch up on contributions late in their careers. 
Salary sacrifi ce contributions are made when an individual trades part 
of his salary for additional employer contributions.
Longitudinal data indicate that a signifi cant proportion of the popu-
lation have higher incomes (with associated capacity to make higher 
contributions) for a relatively limited portion of their working careers. 
A higher contribution cap generally, or at least for those aged 50 and 
over, would assist those who need to catch up and have a capacity to 
do so.
While the pension cocontribution (matching contribution) made by 
the government has been effective in lifting personal contributions of 
low-income individuals, the design parameters of the cocontribution 
and recent cutbacks to them have made the cocontribution less effective 
than it could be. There is a case for both a higher maximum cocontribu-
tion and a lower matching rate in order to encourage greater additional 
contributions.
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Table 9.6  Pension Coverage and Pension Holdings of Men And Women Who Were Not Yet Retired, by Annual 
Salary Income, 2006 and 2010




Pension balance of 
those with super ($)
% with pension
Pension balance of 
those with super ($)
Mean Median Mean Median
Men
< 28,000 75.1 37,312 5,700 79.9 43,553 5,000
28,000 – < 58,000 96.7 70,698 30,000 96.8 62,853 25,000
58,000 – < 80,000 98.1 134,981 65,000 98.7 108,092 50,000
80,000+ 97.8 207,801 110,000 98.6 212,025 110,000
Total 91.4 99,506 35,000 93.9 109,609 40,000
Women
< 28,000 80.7 32,807 9,000 80.9 37,622 8,500
28,000 – < 58,000 96.8 56,253 25,000 96.6 52,885 29,000
58,000 – < 80,000 98.6 102,844 55,000 98.2 98,071 50,000
80,000+ 97.7 158,652 88,000 98.9 142,855 75,000
Total 89.4 55,433 21,000 90.9 63,412 26,000
NOTE: Population weighted results. 
SOURCE: HILDA data.
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The $A450 a Month Threshold for the Superannuation Guarantee 
Mandatory Contributions
While there may have been a rationale for the income threshold 
below which contributions are not required when the mandatory Super-
annuation Guarantee pension system was fi rst introduced, it would make 
sense to remove it now given that nearly all employees have a pension 
account, and processes for making contributions are now more effi -
cient. Around 250,000 individuals, the majority of whom are women, 
would benefi t from removal of the threshold through higher eventual 
retirement savings. The cost to both employers and to the Australian 
budget from removing the threshold would be very modest.
The Self-Employed
Nearly 10 percent of the labor force are self-employed. While tax 
concessions have led to some self-employed persons saving for retire-
ment through pensions, average balances and coverage have remained 
relatively low. Around 29 percent of the self-employed have no pension 
savings (this is more common for males than females). There is a strong 
case to extend compulsory pensions to include the self-employed. 
Individuals on Paid Parental Leave
Paid parental leave is considered by the government to be equiva-
lent to wages in terms of income tax and other treatment of individuals. 
Consistent with this, it would be appropriate for the Superannuation 
Guarantee mandatory pension contributions to apply to such payments, 
which it does not currently do.
One of the reasons that the average pension balance of women is 
lower than that of men is time out of the paid workforce for parental 
reasons. Paying Superannuation Guarantee mandatory contributions on 
parental leave payments would help reduce this difference in entitle-
ments. The effects of compound interest also would be very favorable 
in regard to pension contributions made on behalf of women who take 
parental leave, mostly in their 20s and 30s. The cost to the Australian 
government budget would be just over $A20 million a year.
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Indigenous Australians
Indigenous Australians have lower coverage and lower balances on 
average than the general population, again largely related to differences 
in paid labor force experience. Pension coverage for indigenous Austra-
lians is about 70 percent for men and 60 percent for women, compared 
to rates of 85 percent for men and 80 percent for women for the popula-
tion more generally. Average (mean) balances are also lower than for 
the equivalent Australian population as a whole (Table 9.7). 
Increases in the pension coverage and average pension balances of 
indigenous Australians will clearly be associated with improvements in 
involvement in paid work and in wages. Labor market measures rather 
than pension policies drive labor market outcomes.
However, current pension arrangements and administrative require-
ments do not always mesh well with the circumstances and needs of 
indigenous Australians, particularly those in remote areas who may 
have diffi culty communicating with their pension fund administrators 
and in claiming benefi ts or identifying lost accounts. 
There is scope for the pension industry and the regulators to work 
toward a regulatory framework and administrative arrangements that 
can better cope with the special needs of indigenous Australians. Such 
arrangements also would be likely to benefi t many other Australians.
Table 9.7  Pension Coverage And Pension Holdings of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Men and Women Who Were Not Yet 




Pension balance of 
those with super ($A) % with 
pension
Pension balance of 
those with super ($A)
Mean Median Mean Median
Men 68.3 49,589 9,000 70.7 55,743 14,000
Women 52.1 42,109 10,000 60.6 39,909 15,000
Persons 59.5 46,069 10,000 65.3 47,863 15,000
NOTE: Population weighted results. Not enough cases to break down by age. 
SOURCE: Clare (2012b).
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Recently Divorced Men and Women
Survey data indicate that the distribution of pensions is now much 
more even for those who have recently divorced compared to when 
amendments were made in 2002 to the Family Law Act to allow the 
splitting of pension account balances. The extent of disparities in par-
ticular decreased between 2006 and 2010. While a number of factors 
would have contributed to this, the growing maturity of the compulsory 
pension system leading to higher average account balances for both 
men and women would have played a role, along with more women 
having pensions in their own right. The fi gures also are consistent with 
the parties in a marriage making more use of the splitting arrangements. 
Exposure to Investment Risk
Currently in Australia, around 90 percent of individuals in the pre-
retirement phase who have a pension, and around 75 percent of those 
recently retired with a pension, are exposed to investment risk. The pro-
portion is higher in the preretirement phase given that the newer and 
younger fund members have been predominantly enrolled in defi ned 
contribution arrangements.
As shown in Table 9.8, investment returns in Australia, as in many 
other countries, have not been favorable in recent years. The global 
fi nancial crisis had a signifi cant impact, particularly given the 65–70 
percent exposure on average of most funds to equities.
Investment returns in 2012–2013 were relatively high, with prelim-
inary estimates indicating an average rate of return for default members 
of funds of over 15 percent.
The rationale for relatively high levels of exposure to equities in 
defi ned contribution plans (accumulation funds) is that this will gener-
ally lead to higher retirement benefi ts for members. Most individuals 
will be a member of a pension fund for a period of 40 years or more. 
Subject of course to individual decisions regarding exposure to invest-
ment risk and volatility, there is an argument that such exposure should 
be sustained throughout a member’s career.
However, market volatility means that at least some members will 
wish to shift assets into cash over the fi ve years before retirement. This 
will allow them to cater for any required lump sum benefi t and their 
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initial pension drawdowns. Life cycle investment options can provide 
such an investment strategy. However, while they are suitable for some 
individuals, they may not be suitable for others. 
Historical analysis also indicates that a typical life cycle fund would 
have delivered poorer outcomes for most members over most periods in 
Australia, such as 1900–1970, 1970–1999, and 1900–1999. Now is also 
not a good time to switch allocations from equities to bonds as returns 
to bonds are at historical lows and recent returns from equities, espe-
cially Australian equities, have been relatively strong, with double-digit 
returns in calendar 2012, particularly the second half of 2012.
While consumer satisfaction with pensions tends to follow with a 
lag in developments in investment returns, there has been little pressure 
in Australia for the government to cover any investment losses faced 
by fund members due to general developments in investment markets. 
The only policy response to the global fi nancial crisis was to reduce 
the minimum drawdown factor for individuals who have an individ-
ual account–based (defi ned contribution) income stream in retirement. 
There are compensation arrangements that can be called upon in the 
case of members suffering loss due to fraud or theft in a regulated fund, 
but fortunately fraud or theft are relatively rare in the regulated pension 
funds. Compensation in these cases is effectively funded by members 
of other regulated pension funds through special levies struck by the 
government in such cases.
Table 9.8  Average Annual Fund Investment Returns to June 30, 2012 











SOURCE: Annual survey published by ASFA.
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INCOME STREAMS IN RETIREMENT
In an ideal world, the objective of pensions should be focused on the 
provision of income during the whole of retirement. However, there are 
a number of reasons why it is diffi cult to structure the Australian system 
around regular reliable pension payments. These include the following:
• When pension contributions began to be included in labor agree-
ments in 1986 as deferred pay (in lieu of a possible productivity 
wage rise), it was promoted to members as an addition to the Age 
Pension. The Superannuation Guarantee pension has increased 
the value of contributions, but the message has not changed—
members consider that the private pension account balance is 
their own money and they expect fl exibility of payments.
• The government allows all members above age 60 to retire and 
draw a tax-free lump sum or pension. Most older Australians 
also are subject to low or nil rates of personal income tax given 
low average incomes and various tax rebates. As a result, there 
is only a limited incentive for individuals to leave money in the 
system during retirement. 
• There are no longer maximum withdrawal factors on account-
based defi ned contribution pensions, so nobody is forced to draw 
their benefi ts over time.
• Members can buy lifetime annuities from the private sector 
(albeit from a small number of suppliers), but current sales are 
well under 100 a year in total. Consumer research indicates that 
most Australians are unrealistic about the pricing of an indexed 
lifetime annuity and expect much more than fair value. With-
out compulsion or incentives, most members will not buy these 
products.
• Many members retire with small benefi ts, and they appear com-
fortable with leaving the money in an interest-bearing bank ac-
count rather than in a pension. This may be infl uenced by their 
perception of safety in the bank or by a short time horizon where 
they do not value higher (but uncertain) returns. They may also 
value instant access to their funds.
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• Many people today retire with some debt (including mortgages) 
or the need to carry out home repairs or consumer durable pur-
chases, and it is a rational decision to take a pension lump sum to 
clear all such expenses or debts before retiring.
• Around a third of total pension savings and around half of post-
retirement pension balances are held in Self-Managed Superan-
nuation Funds, which have less than fi ve members and where 
each member is also a trustee of the fund. Such fund members 
generally value control highly and are wary of purchasing an in-
come stream from a third party such as a life insurance company 
or managed fund.
The above situation has made the provision of income streams, 
particularly those that protect members from their longevity risk, dif-
fi cult. In addition, transitional arrangements, especially if compulsion is 
involved, can be problematic due to the plans made by those approach-
ing retirement.
That said, the evidence available indicates that many Australians do 
take an income stream from their pension in retirement, albeit one that 
is account based, where the individual can access the entire account 
balance should they choose to do so. This is particularly the case when 
larger amounts are involved.
As shown in Table 9.9, around 70 percent of males aged 60–64 who 
have recently retired have a pension with an average balance of around 
$A380,000. This is a drop in coverage of around 20 percentage points 
compared to those who are in the same age group who have not retired. 
The average balance is also higher than for those not retired, which 
suggests that those with lower balances are more likely to cash out and 
invest (or spend) elsewhere.
For women, the drop in coverage is greater, at around 30 percentage 
points. Again, the average balances for those retaining retirement sav-
ings in a pension, at around $A255,000, is higher than for those in the 
same age group who have not retired.
These fi gures strongly suggest that the great bulk of recent retirees 
keep their retirement savings primarily in a pension account and draw 
down an income stream. Those retirees who take their retirement sav-
ings out of the pension system are a minority. However, even for this 
minority there is no evidence that the pension savings are used pri-
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marily for immediate consumption purposes, such as an overseas trip. 
While some commentators claim that that frequently happens, such 
assertions are more in the line of urban myths than being supported 
by any objective research. However, in the past it is likely that the rate 
of taking lump sums was higher, in part due to account balances of 
those in defi ned contribution pension schemes being relatively low. For 
lower account balances, the tax benefi ts of remaining within the private 
pension system are not large. Elderly Australians, particularly elderly 
women, commonly have low or no private pension account balance 
because they either never had pension contributions in the fi rst place or 
they have exhausted their pension account balances.
However, clearly there is scope for more retirement benefi ts to be 
taken in income stream form. 
Table 9.9  Pension Coverage and Pension Holdings of Men and Women 






Pension balance of 
those with super ($A) % with 
pension
Pension balance of 
those with super ($A)
Mean Median Mean Median
Men
<60 70.2 283,430 200,000 89.8 528,105 386,000
60–64 76.7 573,228 500,000 68.8 381,703 250,000
65–69 48.1 421,618 200,000 65.7 299,161 164,000
70+ 41.6 283,938a 162,000a 32.3 273,218a 90,000a
Total 60.7 419,841 280,000 60.8 367,336 245,000
Women
<60 62.1 322,945 100,000 63.7 135,501 53,000
60–64 53.1 273,135 195,000 58.6 255,485 120,000
65–69 46.4 129,491 90,000 41.7 205,855 70,000
70+ 41.6a 48,358a 15,000a 7.1a 184,000a 184,000a
Total 54.5 254,647 100,000 53.0 191,474 102,000
aEstimate not reliable.
NOTE: Population weighted results. “Recently retired” if “currently retired and observed 
not retired (i.e., employed) at some stage in the last three years.”
SOURCE: HILDA data.
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Designing better postretirement arrangements
The primary purpose of pensions is to provide fi nancial security in 
retirement. This purpose is not currently being achieved as much as it 
could be in Australia, as there are many potential leakages that are at 
a cost to the system’s integrity and the taxation concessions provided. 
These potential leakages include 
• using pension benefi ts too fast, which manifests in several ways, 
such as having insuffi cient longevity protection and excessively 
running down retirement savings to either fund excessive con-
sumption and/or debts that were built up in the lead up to retire-
ment in the knowledge that a lump sum would be available; and 
• using pension benefi ts too slowly (i.e., poor lifestyle in retire-
ment) and leaving these benefi ts for others in the estate.
While the evidence available indicates that most retirees make 
sensible decisions regarding the investment of their retirement sav-
ings, there is scope to strengthen arrangements in advice, defaults, and 
compulsion.
The ASFA currently has a major project under way with the aim 
of facilitating or requiring the better provision of retirement income 
streams. This work is well under way but is not yet complete.
The following 11 guiding principles have infl uenced ASFA’s 
thinking:
 1) The main focus of pensions should be on income streams in 
retirement, as opposed to lump sums or estate planning. Pen-
sions in the postretirement phase should be designed to ensure 
that pension income streams, in conjunction with full or partial 
Age Pension payments, provide income and dignity in retire-
ment until death. 
 2) The retirement income system (including both tax concessions 
and Age Pension payments) must be perceived to be fair, when 
assessed across all components of the system and across the 
lifetime of individuals, including both the pre- and postretire-
ment phases.
 3) Changes should not undermine confi dence in the system; that 
is, in terms of both the changes made and the need for long 
lead times. 
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 4) The system must be comprehensive, covering people in differ-
ent types of employment structures, such as employees, con-
tractors, and the self-employed.
 5) The retirement income system needs to be fl exible, recogniz-
ing the need to take into account the varying patterns of work 
and lifetime income that exist. Phased retirement should also 
be encouraged as a means of helping people stay in the work-
force longer, not as a tax evasion mechanism.
 6) The retirement income system should be robust and able to 
withstand a range of reasonable economic conditions with-
out signifi cantly reducing the expectations of the individuals 
involved. 
 7) The means test for the Age Pension has an important role to 
play in determining the amount of government assistance that 
retirees receive. In particular, those individuals or family units 
who earn below average wages, or who spend time out of the 
workforce (e.g., to raise a family or because they cannot get a 
job) should receive substantial support from the government 
to achieve a basic income in retirement. On the other hand, 
individuals and couples who continue in paid employment past 
customary retirement age and/or who have substantial pension 
and other assets that support a lifestyle in retirement more sub-
stantial than that described in the ASFA Retirement Standard at 
the comfortable level should receive little or no Age Pension.
 8) The mandatory pension system needs to have a relatively high 
degree of guidance and constraints (including good default 
systems) in order to protect people from unwise or excessively 
short-term actions. For example, it needs to 
• require long-term savings with restricted access prior to 
retirement,
• provide income in retirement, and
• reduce risks during both the accumulation and retirement 
phases.
 9) There needs to be access to deferred annuities, the purchase 
of which could start in either the accumulation or drawdown 
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stage. This will necessitate the removal of prudential supervi-
sion and tax regulatory roadblocks in order to allow the offer-
ing of deferred annuities in either the accumulation or draw-
down phase. 
 10) Incentives and default settings should be the initial approach 
to obtaining the desired outcomes. However, if such arrange-
ments are not effective in producing desired outcomes, then 
consideration may need to be given to introducing a degree 
of compulsion with respect to the taking of income streams in 
retirement. For instance, this could be achieved through the 
application of tax penalties with respect to taking benefi ts in 
any one of the following:
• as a lump sum, 
• in the form of a noncomplying income stream, or
•  if there is noncompliance with either the minimum or 
maximum drawdown factor of a complying account based 
income stream.
 11) The requirements should apply to all pension structures, 
including self-managed superannuation funds, which are small 
plans, where provisions are relevant.
CONCLUSION
The Australian pensions system is not without its shortcomings. 
Among other things it is too complex, particularly in regard to the taxa-
tion of contributions and fund earnings, it is not yet mature enough to 
deliver for most a comfortable standard of living in retirement, and it 
does not deal well with the fi nancial consequences of longevity for the 
large majority of members who are in defi ned contribution schemes.
However, compared to systems in most other countries, the Aus-
tralian pensions system is sustainable, in that the respective burdens on 
governments, employers and individuals are manageable both now and 
in the future. It is comprehensive, in that all Australians benefi t from 
an Age Pension from the government, which keeps individuals from 
up14msssapch9.indd   215 1/31/2014   10:21:45 AM
216   Clare
poverty in retirement with near universal coverage of private pensions 
of employees and substantial coverage of the self employed. It is equi-
table, in that when all the elements of the system are looked at together, 
the amount of government assistance is broadly comparable across the 
income distribution. Finally, the Australian pension system helps to 
strengthen the fi nancial system, in that assets in the pension system are 
invested in the real economy rather in notional securities issued by a 
central government.
References
Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA). 2013. ASFA Retire-
ment Standard. Sydney: Association of Superannuation Funds of Austra-
lia. http://www.superannuation.asn.au/resources/retirement-standard/ (ac-
cessed October 3, 2013.)
Australian Treasury. 2010. Australia to 2050: Future Challenges. Intergenera-
tional report. Canberra: Australia. 
Clare, Ross. 2012a. “The Equity of Government Assistance for Retirement 
Income in Australia.” ASFA Research Paper. Sydney: Association of Super-
annuation Funds of Australia.
———. 2012b. Equity and Superannuation—the Real Issues. Sydney: Asso-
ciation of Superannuation Funds of Australia.
up14msssapch9.indd   216 1/31/2014   10:21:45 AM
